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 Civil recourse theory, as its name implies, sees private law as 
providing a means by which individuals may have recourse against 
those who have wronged them, albeit in a civilized manner.1 Of 
course, no one would deny that much of private law does in fact pro-
vide private individuals with a means of recourse, but civil recourse 
theorists take pride in the fact that their theory, unlike competing 
theories, sees the right to recourse as the focal point of private law.2
By contrast, law and economics scholars argue that the rules of tort 
law, for example, aim to regulate conduct by providing individuals 
the incentives to take appropriate levels of caution, where what 
counts as “appropriate” is whatever would maximize welfare.3 But 
they cannot explain why enforcement of these rules is left to private 
plaintiffs, who can choose to enforce or not as they please. Corrective 
justice theorists have a very different view of the aims of tort law, but 
a similar problem. For corrective justice theorists, tort law aims (very 
roughly speaking) to do justice among the private individuals to a 
suit rather than provide incentives for society at large.4 Wrongdoers 
have a so-called secondary duty to repair the harm caused by the 
breach of a primary duty, such as the duty to take due care not to 
harm others.5 But even if corrective justice theorists are correct that 
wrongdoers have such secondary duties, it is again not clear why the 
state would leave enforcement of those duties to the whims of private 
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parties, with the result that much wrongdoing will go unaddressed if 
the victims choose not to pursue the matter. 
 Civil recourse theorists argue that the central feature of private 
law is the empowerment of private citizens to bring claims to address 
wrongs done to them.6 These theorists argue that the right to bring 
civil claims is justified by a similar precivil right to respond to 
wrongdoing. Drawing on social-contract theory, in particular that of 
John Locke, civil recourse theorists argue that in the state of nature, 
individuals would have a right to respond to wrongdoing committed 
against them.7 This right to respond is part of the compromise of the 
social contract, one of the things we give up in exchange for the bene-
fits of living in an orderly society. But we do not give up that right for 
nothing; rather, in exchange we receive a right to respond to wrong-
doing in a civilized fashion within the confines of the justice system. 
The state is justified in helping one citizen act against another be-
cause a victim has a moral right to act, or would have such a right in 
a state of nature. In fact, the state is not only justified in providing 
such avenues of recourse, it is perhaps even required to do so as a 
condition of its legitimacy. 
 It is not entirely clear, however, just how different civil recourse 
theory is from corrective justice theory, and indeed, in this conference 
we heard vigorous arguments that it adds little or nothing to the 
framework already provided by corrective justice theorists. Most of 
those arguments took place among tort scholars.8 I enjoyed them as a 
spectacle, but as a contracts scholar I do not have a dog in that fight. 
I am, however, quite interested in the claim that civil recourse is a 
theory not just of tort law, but of private law more broadly speaking.  
 It is my goal here to raise serious doubts about civil recourse theo-
ry’s ability to explain private law generally, and contract law in par-
ticular. However much we can distinguish between civil recourse 
theory and corrective justice theory, I argue that both suffer similar 
shortcomings when offered as explanations of contract law. Both the-
ories, at least as commonly understood, see private law as a response 
(of some sort) to wrongdoing, but contract law is for the most part not 
concerned with wrongdoing. With some effort, both theories may be 
made to fit the structure of contract law to a certain degree, but only 
when they are so stripped of normative content as to be largely struc-
tural. In short, if civil recourse theory is understood just to be the 
 6.  Id. at 738-39.
 7.  See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and 
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 541-44 (2005); Zipursky,
Private Law, supra note 1, at 637-40.
 8.  See WEINRIB, supra note 4, at 134-36; Goldberg, supra note 7; Zipursky, Private 
Law, supra note 1; see also JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 373-74 (1992); Stephen 
R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 478-88 (1992); Richard 
W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 634-40 (1992).
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view that the private law empowers plaintiffs to bring claims, then it 
is certainly true. But if it goes further and argues that the empower-
ment is based on a prelegal right to respond to wrongdoing, then it 
cannot explain our modern contract law, however well it may explain 
tort law. Moreover, I argue that this result is inevitable because con-
tract law is a matter of power-conferring rules rather than duty-
imposing rules, and civil recourse theory is not equipped to explain 
areas of law that are designed to enable rather than admonish. 
I. WRONGDOING AND CONTRACT LAW
 Corrective justice theorists argue that tortfeasors incur a so-called 
“secondary” duty to repair the wrongs that their wrongdoing causes.9
Civil recourse theorists argue that tort victims have a right to re-
spond to wrongs done to them by others.10 In both cases, however, 
there is presupposed an underlying primary right and duty. For ex-
ample, a driver has a duty to her passengers not to drive carelessly, 
and those passengers have a right against the driver not to be 
harmed by her careless driving. If the driver breaches that duty and 
injures her passengers, then according to the corrective justice theo-
rists she incurs a secondary duty to repair their injury (as best she 
can), and according to the civil recourse theorists the passengers gain 
a right to respond to the driver for her wrongdoing. Presumably, in 
the standard case all of these rights and duties exist prior to govern-
ment (“prior” in the logical, and not necessarily temporal, sense). The 
argument is that the rules of tort law reflect these prelegal rights 
and duties and are at least to some extent justified by them. For that 
reason, we expect the legal rules to correlate to some degree with the 
prelegal rights and duties. So tort law asks, for example, not only 
whether the driver caused the accident, but to what degree the driver 
was at fault in doing so, to what degree the passengers may also have 
been at fault, and to what degree their injuries were foreseeable. 
 That all sounds perfectly reasonable as an account of tort law. And 
there are those who have argued that contract law works in a similar 
fashion. Most famously, Charles Fried argued that contract law is 
based on the “promise principle,” according to which the rules of con-
tract law are based on the moral obligations of promisors to live up to 
their self-imposed commitments.11 The primary duty under such an 
account is the duty to keep one’s promises; the breach of the promise 
constitutes a breach of that duty; and damages represent the promi-
 9.  See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 72, 147 (2004) (“Corrective justice is 
meant to explain (secondary) duties to repair rather than (primary) duties not to cause 
wrongful losses.”).
 10.  See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 1, at 738-39.
 11.  CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
1 (1981).
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sor’s secondary duty in light of his breach—or, under the civil re-
course view, the plaintiff’s right to bring a suit is based on the promi-
see’s right to respond to the wrongdoing of the broken promise. 
 For Fried, the duty to keep a promise has a decidedly Kantian fla-
vor.12 Kantian or not, it is familiar and quite plausible. Indeed, much 
of the literature on both civil recourse and corrective justice (in both 
tort and contract) is full of references to venerable and aged sources, 
apparently in an attempt to show that the underlying norms are not 
only uncontroversial, they are deeply embedded in our culture and 
have been for centuries. Thus, Zipursky appeals to Locke and, to a 
lesser degree, Blackstone;13 Goldberg seconds him on Locke, and further 
emphasizes Blackstone, Coke, and the like.14 Weinrib famously locates 
the roots of corrective justice in Aristotle.15 And Nate Oman outdoes 
everyone by tracing a version of civil recourse theory all the way back 
to the Bible (the Old Testament, no less) and the Homeric epics.16
 But no matter how well established the moral duty to keep one’s 
promises is—and, by the way, among moral philosophers it may not 
be so well established as one would think—that moral duty does not 
seem to factor into modern, Anglo-American contract law much at all. 
This is a point I have argued elsewhere,17 so I will not belabor it here. 
It will suffice for now to give just a few bits of evidence. 
 Most tellingly, contract law, unlike most of tort law, has a strict-
liability standard. That means that no inquiry is made into why one 
breached. Thus, even if the breaching party has a very compelling 
story—a lost job, a crash in the economy, an unexpected competing 
moral obligation such as a sick relative—such stories are generally 
not even entertained in court. (What limited excuses are available 
are usually explained as an interpretation of the original agreement, 
and thus not really a matter of breach at all.18) Conversely, if one is a 
particularly nefarious breacher, very little is likely to come of it. 
Punitive damages are not awarded except for very narrow exceptions, 
and so-called “willfulness” only matters on the margins and in 
certain circumstances.  
 Perhaps more importantly, promises are generally only enforcea-
ble when supported by consideration. There was a time when one 
could make one’s promise legally enforceable just by being careful 
 12.  Id. at 17, 19.
 13.  See Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 1, at 637-42; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self-
Defense, Domination, and the Social Contract, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 606-08 (1996).
 14.  See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 541-59.
 15.  See WEINRIB, supra note 4, at 56-83.
 16.  Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual 
Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529, 531 (2011).
 17.  Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability With Corrective Justice in Contract 
Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3013 (2007).
 18.  Id. at 3034-39.
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enough to make the promise in the prescribed formal manner that 
would highlight the solemnity of the occasion, but for the most part 
courts are now only interested in picking out bargained-for exchang-
es.19 In fact, in many cases courts go out of their way to acknowledge 
a promisor’s moral obligation even as they refuse to enforce the con-
tract.20 The moralist Fried is forced simply to dismiss the considera-
tion doctrine as a historical accident.21 Accident or no, it is the first 
cut in our contract law between those promises that are enforceable 
and those that are not. Moral obligation, by contrast, seems to play 
no role at all. 
 In recent years, some theorists have struggled to pull contract law 
within the corrective justice or civil recourse camps. For example, 
Nate Oman argues that since biblical times private parties have tak-
en certain sorts of agreements seriously enough that they actually 
authorized violence against their own persons if the agreement were 
to be broken.22 In ancient times this authorization was made vivid 
and unmistakable by the symbolic act of animal sacrifice. By publicly 
sacrificing an animal, a promisor said to the promisee—and, im-
portantly, to his own kin—that if he should break his promise, the 
promisee was entitled to take such violent action against him. Oman 
highlights the adversarial nature of litigation in modern legal sys-
tems and argues that it is a civilized version of the sort of martial 
conflict that would have taken place in precivil societies.23 Civil re-
course theorists are often accused of advocating revenge, a charge 
that seems to make them squeamish at best, but Oman’s message to 
them is to buck up and bite the bullet.24 Private rights of action are 
rights to attack in court, and such attacks are acceptable because 
they replace the real-life attacks that used to occur outside of court. 
 Fascinating as his view is, though, it bears little relationship to 
the central doctrines of modern contract law.25 While one likely has a 
moral obligation to keep one’s promises, moral obligations are a mat-
ter of degree. Broken promises generally do not give rise to the sort of 
justified outrage that, say, intentional injuries do. In order for civil 
 19.  1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 
2:2 (4th ed. 2007) (“Centuries before the recognition of simple contracts, promises under 
seal were held binding. . . . The obligation of the maker of a sealed instrument under the 
common law was dependent solely on whether certain forms were observed.”).
 20.  See, e.g., Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 211 (Mass. 1825) (“A deliberate 
promise, in writing, made freely and without any mistake, one which may lead the party to 
whom it is made into contracts and expenses, cannot be broken without a violation of moral 
duty. But if there was nothing paid or promised for it, the law, perhaps wisely, leaves the 
execution of it to the conscience of him who makes it.”). 
 21.  FRIED, supra note 11, at 28-39.
 22.  Oman, supra note 16, at 531.
 23.  Id. at 545-51.
 24.  Id. at 533.
 25.  It may not correspond to much of modern morality either.
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recourse theory both to explain and justify, it must presumably be 
able to identify compelling primary obligations, the breach of which 
would give rise not only to rights to respond, but rights to respond 
that are compelling enough to demand the state’s help. And finally, 
there would need to be some level of correspondence between the par-
ticular rules of contract law and the underlying primary duties and 
rights to respond. 
 As I mentioned above, contract law has a strict liability standard. 
Defendants are not allowed to give reasons that justify their nonper-
formance, nor are plaintiffs allowed to give reasons why the defend-
ant’s nonperformance was particularly galling in the present case. 
Similarly, executory promises are enforced nearly as readily as half-
completed exchanges (I say “nearly” because reliance will allow a 
plaintiff to avoid certain defenses), even though presumably they 
would give rise to much less reason for outrage than half-completed 
exchanges. And perhaps worst of all for Oman’s argument, punitive 
damages are not enforced even if consented to at the outset.26 People 
often find the state’s unwillingness to enforce punitive liquidated-
damages clauses perplexing, but an example similar to the one Oman 
mentions justifies the state’s reticence: suppose I agree that if I 
breach you may punch me in the nose. If upon breach I refuse to let 
you punch me, should the state hold me down so that you can take a 
swing? Most of us find state-assisted private violence unpalatable, to 
say the least. But the example may be unpalatable not only because 
of the violence, but also because it is state-assisted private vengeance 
or punishment. Punitive liquidated-damages clauses are of course not 
so graphic, but are objectionable for similar reasons. Perhaps some 
private wrongs are bad enough to warrant state-assisted private pun-
ishment—for example, the sort of egregious wrongs that lead to puni-
tive damages in tort law—but we generally do not believe broken 
promises rise to that level. 
 While Oman sees contract law and practice as a passionate exer-
cise, others have gone to the opposite extreme, seeking to make con-
tract law fit corrective justice and/or civil recourse theory by reducing 
it to a lifeless structure. For example, I myself have argued that cor-
rective justice and contract law can comfortably coincide despite con-
tract law’s indifference to moral considerations.27 The key, I argued, 
is to understand the act of contracting as creating a legal entitlement 
to performance, the frustration of which gives rise to a secondary du-
ty on the part of the contract breaker to pay damages to the promi-
see.28 The right to performance, on this view, is akin to a property 
 26.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981).
 27.  See generally Bridgeman, supra note 17.
 28.  Id. at 3022; see also Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract 
Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 64-70 (2003).
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right, where infringements are a matter of strict liability. Contracts 
give the promisor a duty to repair (in accordance with corrective jus-
tice theory); and, they also empower the promisee to bring a claim 
against the promisor in the event of breach (in accordance with civil 
recourse theory). But my argument gave no account of the source of 
the duty to keep one’s promise to begin with. Rather, it just treated 
the right to performance as a given fact. As Richard Craswell has 
pointed out, this view is consistent with just about any theory of why 
contracts are enforceable,29 and thus it is not at all clear that it ex-
plains contract law in any important way. 
 Others have argued for similar “entitlement” or “transfer” theories 
in more detail, specifically Peter Benson before me and Andrew Gold 
after.30 Benson and Gold have much more to say about the source of 
the right to entitlement, locating its origin in property rights.31 These 
property rights are traced to pre-legal ownership of one’s own body 
and labor. (Benson, especially in his early work, relies heavily on He-
gel in structuring his account;32 Gold relies heavily on Locke.)33 Gold 
takes the further step of explaining how it is at least conceptually 
possible to reconcile corrective justice with civil recourse.34 This is not 
the place to respond to those arguments. Suffice it to say that, though 
intriguing, I find them implausible—both the underlying moral 
claims and the fit between our modern contract law and these claims. 
They build all of private law on the shaky foundations of rights of 
first acquisition and “ownership” of one’s body and one’s labor. 
 It seems, then, that civil recourse theorists are in the same situa-
tion as corrective justice theorists. Both theories claim to be theories 
of private law generally, but have only flourished as theories of tort. 
As explanations of contract law, they either collapse into merely 
structural theories, or else rely on implausible moral claims that 
 29.  He has made this point to me privately about my own arguments regarding 
corrective justice, and has made similar points elsewhere about other kinds of entitlement 
theories. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Expectation Damages and Contract Theory Revisited,
19-22 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 325, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=925980. 
 30.  Peter Benson, Philosophy of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 752 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); 
Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
 31.  See Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 29 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010); Peter Benson, The Expectation and 
Reliance Interests in Contract Theory: A Reply to Fuller and Perdue, ISSUES IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP (2001), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss1/art5; Peter Benson, The 
Idea of a Public Basis of Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273 (1995); 
Peter Benson, supra note 30; Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF 
CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
 32.  Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of 
Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1177 (1989).
 33.  See Gold, supra note 30.
 34.  See Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1873 (2011).
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even if true do not fit the norms of contract law well. Of course, my 
cursory claims here have not proven any such thing, and in truth I 
have been unfairly dismissive of a great deal of worthwhile scholar-
ship. But that is because my aim here is not to jump back into those 
trenches, but rather to take a step back and think about why it may 
be the case that no such theory could explain contract law. In the 
next part of this Article, I try to explain why these theories of con-
tract are doomed from the start. Drawing on Hart’s distinction be-
tween power-conferring and duty-imposing rules, I briefly argue that 
(a) contract law is a matter of power-conferring, not duty-imposing 
rules, and (b) as such, it is an unlikely candidate for anything more 
than a purely structural corrective justice or civil recourse theory. 
II. CONTRACT LAW AS A SET OF POWER-CONFERRING RULES
 The legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart famously distinguished be-
tween two types of legal rules, duty-imposing rules and power-
conferring rules.35 Duty-imposing rules are rules which, as their 
name implies, impose duties on citizens.36 Importantly, these duties 
are imposed on citizens whether the citizens wish them to be imposed 
or not.37 So, for example, the rules of criminal law forbid murder, 
theft, and other undesirable social behavior, and they forbid such be-
havior for everyone, not just those citizens who choose to be bound by 
the rules. The same can be said for duties in tort law, such as the 
rules that forbid both certain kinds of intentional acts and the rules 
that demand that due care be taken.  
 By contrast, the law also includes power-conferring rules.38 Power-
conferring rules are rules that enable actors to act so as to create a 
legal change if they so choose.39 So, for example, the law sets out the 
steps by which a legislature can create certain kinds of legal change 
if it so chooses, even as it does not insist that the legislature make 
such changes. Similarly, a private party may execute a legally en-
forceable will if she so chooses, or a couple may marry if they so 
choose. These decisions will be given legal effect so long as the indi-
viduals follow the steps laid out by law. But the law does not require 
anyone to marry or (with few exceptions) bequeath property to any-
one, and it is largely indifferent as to whether anyone wants to do so. 
Rather, it simply empowers them to do so if they so choose. 
 Whether contract law is a matter of duty-imposing rules or power-
conferring rules is not entirely clear and has been the subject of some 
 35.  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27-28 (2d ed. 1994).
 36.  Id. at 27.
 37.  Id.
 38.  Id. at 27-28.
 39.  Id.
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debate recently.40 Hart claimed that it is a matter of power-conferring 
rules, though he did not elaborate as to why.41 More importantly, he 
did not explain how to tell power-conferring rules from duty-imposing 
rules. It seems likely that the answer depends a great deal on one’s 
understanding of contract law. 
 For instance, the most obvious example of a power-conferring the-
ory of contract is Randy Barnett’s consent theory of contract law.42
Barnett argues that the most important pillar of contract law is an 
individual’s consent to be bound.43 On his view, contract is similar to 
a form of private legislation whereby parties are empowered to cre-
ate special legal obligations for their own benefit. These obligations 
are freely chosen, and unless the parties manifest an intention to be 
legally bound, they should be free to keep their promises or not as 
they choose.  
 By contrast, an obvious example of a duty-imposing theory of con-
tract would be one of the theories that collapses contract law into a 
form of tort law.44 According to these theories, the fact that individu-
als choose to take on an obligation is not nearly so important as is 
often supposed. Instead, contract law is just one part of a general law 
of obligations, according to which liability is imposed more because of 
a benefit received or harm given than because of any willful choice to 
be bound by the promisor. Indeed, for these theorists, promises are 
only artificially placed at the center of contract law through the vehi-
cle of implied promises. For these thinkers, a more accurate and jus-
tifiable view of contract law would focus less on promises and more 
on harms (like tort law) or benefits (like the law of unjust enrich-
ment). Presumably such a law of contracts-as-obligations would be 
primarily made up of duty-imposing rules. 
 Other theories are not so easy to classify. It would appear at first 
that Charles Fried’s famous promise-based theory is also a duty-
imposing theory.45 He sees contract law as based on the “promise 
principle,” by which he apparently means the moral duty to keep 
 40.  See Curtis Bridgeman & John C.P. Goldberg, Do Promises Distinguish Contract 
from Tort?, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2012); Gregory Klass, Three Pictures 
of Contract, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1729 (2008).
 41.  HART, supra note 35, at 27-28.
 42.  See generally Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
269, 270-71 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett, Consent Theory]; see also Randy E. Barnett, The 
Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992); Randy 
E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil’s Relational Theory of Contract,
78 VA. L. REV. 1175, 1175-76 (1992). 
 43.  Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 42, at 303.
 44.  See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 
2d ed.1995); P.S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obligations, in ESSAYS ON 
CONTRACT 10 (1986).
 45.  See Klass, supra note 40, at 1727, 1771.
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one’s promises.46 According to Fried, moral principles do not “depend 
on fashion or favor”; rather, they apply whether individuals want 
them to or not.47 “Contracts must be kept because promises must be 
kept,” i.e., because of our moral duty to keep our promises.48 Thus, in 
his excellent recent work on the subject, Greg Klass lists Fried’s 
promise theory as a paradigmatic example of a duty-imposing theory.49
 However, on reflection, Fried’s view is not so easily classified. For 
one thing, for all his talk of morality Fried is also eager to classify his 
own theory as a liberal theory, one that is in part based on the state’s 
duty to insure that its citizens are as free as they can possibly be 
within the limits of a like freedom for all other citizens. He clearly 
feels more at home with Randy Barnett’s libertarian view than with 
the tort-like theories; indeed, such theories were the primary target 
of his book. For Fried, promising is not just another way that we 
might happen to harm others wrongfully, but rather is a way in 
which individuals can bind themselves through their own autonomous 
choice. Although he does not discuss the distinction between duty-
imposing and power-conferring rules, it is clear that a principle moti-
vation of Fried’s book is to establish that contract is different from 
tort precisely because the obligations of contract law are freely chosen.  
 Indeed, as John Goldberg and I argue in a recent paper, that dis-
tinction is a much more important distinction in the divide between 
contract and tort than merely noting whether a promise is present or 
not.50 We offer a test for whether a theory is duty-imposing or power-
conferring. Very briefly put, the test comes down to whether one’s 
theory of contract would allow parties who enter into an agreement 
to avoid legal obligation even as they undertake a promissory moral 
obligation. In other words, suppose parties exchange promises which 
they mutually agree at the time of the exchange will be morally but 
not legally binding. Should the law enforce such promises?  
 Fried focuses on the fact that promissory duties are freely under-
taken, but he does not highlight the distinction between moral prom-
issory duties and one’s legal duty to keep a promise. Although we 
make promises of our own free will, once we have made a promise the 
moral duty to keep one’s promises applies whether one wishes it to or 
not.51 One can well imagine a moralist contract regime in which the 
 46.  FRIED, supra note 11, at 1.
 47.  Id. at 2.
 48. Id. at 17.
 49.  Gregory Klass, Promise Etc., 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2012).
 50.  Bridgeman & Goldberg, supra note 40.
 51.  That is not to say that the duty to keep a promise applies no matter what. In some 
situations we may be morally excused from performance, for example, because of 
competing and more compelling moral demands (I might be excused from my promise to 
have lunch with you if an emergency arises that morally requires my attention at that 
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moral duty to keep one’s promise is deemed so important to the state 
that the state chooses to enforce that duty whether the parties 
wished it to be legally enforceable or not, similar to many of the du-
ties in tort law or criminal law. Indeed, we argue that a heretofore 
unappreciated problem with Fried’s theory is that it is hard to under-
stand what sort of moral obligation could be so important as to un-
dergird an entire body of law as important as contract law, yet so un-
important that the state would allow parties to eschew legal en-
forcement of that obligation so easily.52 On the other hand, if Fried 
would not allow parties to avoid legal liability for their promises, 
then contract law looks much more duty-imposing, and therefore 
much more tort-like, than he seems to think it is. 
 As we explain, as a matter of positive law, our current law is ap-
parently unwilling to enforce such promises.53 Although the Second 
Restatement of Contracts does not require an express intention to 
enter into a legally binding agreement in order for there to be an en-
forceable contract, “a manifestation of intention that a promise shall 
not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.”54
Comment b is even more explicit, “[P]arties to what would otherwise 
be a bargain and a contract sometimes agree that their legal rela-
tions are not to be affected. In the absence of any invalidating cause, 
such a term is respected . . . like any other term . . . .”55 If our contract 
law were a tort-like, duty-imposing regime, grounded in the moral 
duty to keep one’s promise, then it might enforce promissory moral 
obligations even if the parties did not want enforcement. Just as par-
ties are not free to opt out of the duty to take due care,56 we can imag-
                                                                                                                  
time). My point here is merely that whether I am now morally obligated to keep the 
promise or morally excused is no longer a matter of choice for me.
 52.  Although we present this as a challenge for Fried’s view, it is not necessarily an 
insurmountable one for a promissory view that had a much richer account of the nature 
and value of promising. For example, the ability to bind ourselves morally and perhaps 
legally could be so important to the development of close personal relationships, and 
therefore to human flourishing generally, that it would be a requirement of a legitimate 
state that it offer an enforcement regime if able. For views that wrestle with something 
close to this view, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise,
120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, 
and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV. 481 (2008); and DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO 
CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACTS 2-3 (2003). Although those scholars 
do not to my knowledge address the specific question at issue here, it is possible that such 
studies could explain how contracts could be based on moral, promissory obligations while 
still allowing parties to avoid legal enforcement. 
 53.  For a limited discussion of cases, see Bridgeman & Goldberg, supra note 40.
 54.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981).
 55.  Id. at cmt. b.
 56.  Of course, in many cases, parties are free to agree to hold each other harmless, for 
example if a customer at a ski lift agrees to waive any liability for future injuries on the 
part of the operator of the ski lift. But this is just an example of contract preempting tort 
by presettling any future claims. And in any event, in many cases the law will not enforce 
such agreements. For example, a doctor generally cannot escape the duty to take due care when 
treating patients simply by having the patient waive the right to sue prior to treatment. 
12 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 39:1  
ine a regime in which they could not opt out of the duty to keep their 
promises. The fact that our system is almost certainly not such a sys-
tem, though, is relevant to whether civil recourse can succeed as a 
theory of private law, as I argue in the next part of this Article.  
III.   CIVIL RECOURSE OR CIVIL POWERS?
 My argument in this final part is relatively simple: Civil recourse 
(and perhaps corrective justice) is much better suited to explaining a 
system of duty-imposing rules than a system of power-conferring 
rules. That is fine, so long as the theory is confined to tort law, which 
is a system of duty-imposing rules. But much of the private law in-
volves power-conferring rules. Therefore, civil recourse (at least in its 
more substantive form) is unlikely to succeed as a theory of private 
law generally.  
 Recall that civil recourse theory posits that private law is designed 
to empower plaintiffs to respond to wrongdoing. For that reason, it 
may sound at first as though civil recourse would be a natural fit 
with a set of power-conferring rules. But we must be more careful 
with our terminology. It is one thing for the state to empower plain-
tiffs by giving them a way to respond to wrongdoings done to them. It 
is yet another for the state to establish a legal system designed to 
allow private parties to create rights and duties where there were 
none before. The term “power-conferring rules” in Hart’s sense refers 
to the latter, that is, to rules that are designed to empower private 
citizens to change their legal rights and duties by following certain 
steps. The rules of tort law do give victims power, but limited to the 
power to respond to wrongs (usually in court), not to change what 
counts as a wrong in the first place.57
 I argued above (and at more length elsewhere)58 that civil recourse 
theory is unlikely to explain contract law. Although contract law does 
empower the promisee to bring a claim, it does not seem to be moti-
vated by any concern for wrongdoing by the promisor. In a state of 
nature, promisees may have a right to respond to the wrong done to 
them when the promisor fails to keep a promise, but even if that is 
true, that right seems to bear little resemblance to the vindication of 
rights in our law of contract. Modern contract law also empowers 
plaintiffs from a civil recourse theorist’s view; specifically, it empow-
ers them to vindicate their contract rights. But the rights plaintiffs 
are empowered to enforce in modern contract law seem to be legal 
 57.  We may well still want to call tort law power-conferring in this sense. Zipursky 
does, referring to Hart’s distinction. See Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 1, at 632. That 
is fine, so long as we keep the distinction in mind between a law which empowers citizens 
to create legal rights and duties and a law which empowers citizens to enforce legal rights 
and duties.
 58.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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entitlements, not moral rights to respond to broken promises (if there 
are such moral rights).  
 To illustrate the distinction better, consider one area of private 
law almost never discussed in the general philosophical literature on 
private law: the law of wills. There can be little doubt that the law of 
wills is a matter of private law, despite its neglect by private law the-
orists. Its exclusive concern is the passing of property from one pri-
vate party (the decedent) to another private party (the beneficiary) 
upon the decedent’s death and by the decedent’s own choice. The law 
of wills does empower individuals to pass on property as they see fit, 
but it does not do so because individuals have a duty to pass on prop-
erty in the state of nature.59 In fact, the law seems largely indifferent 
to whether individuals choose to pass on property to one person or 
another. It is merely an enabling law. 
 Of course, once a legal entitlement is established, the law of wills 
also empowers people in the sense that civil recourse theorists in-
tend. A named heir in a will has the power to make a claim in court 
to obtain certain property bequeathed to her that remains in the pos-
session of someone else. In other words, once her right to the proper-
ty has been created, she is empowered to bring a claim. But the law 
of wills differs from the law of torts in that the former is designed to 
allow private parties to create such rights (or not, as they choose), 
whereas the rights and duties in criminal law or the law of torts ap-
ply to individuals regardless of their choice. The law simply imposes 
the obligations rather than setting up a system for private imposition 
of obligations at the choice of private parties. 
 Similarly, contract law is power-conferring in this same sense. 
The law provides a mechanism by which parties can change their le-
gal rights and duties if they so choose. The law is indifferent as to 
whether A hires B to plow A’s field in exchange for money, but if A 
and B decide to make such an exchange, contract law provides a way 
for them to make the agreement legally enforceable. If B breaches, 
the law may well provide a remedy for A. It is tempting at first to see 
contract law as addressing the wrong done to A by B, but as we have 
seen, contract law is not really responsive to wrongdoing. Moreover, 
A and B may opt out of legal enforcement despite the presence of 
moral wronging if they so choose.  
 If I am correct that the point of contract is not to respond to 
wrongdoing, then corrective justice theory and civil recourse theory 
are unlikely candidates to explain contract law, just as they cannot 
explain the law of wills. Corrective justice theory posits that private 
law, or tort law anyway, is primarily concerned with an injurer’s duty 
to repair the damage his wrongdoing has caused. Civil recourse theo-
 59.  Forced heir statutes could arguably be an exception, but these are rare.
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ry posits that private law, or tort law anyway, is primarily concerned 
with giving victims of wrongdoing a civilized method of responding to 
wrongdoings done to them that replaces their prelegal moral right to 
respond. Both are concerned with violations of a moral duty. But that 
is not the point, or at least not the main point, of contract law, just as 
it is not the main point of the law of wills. Power-conferring rules en-
able rather than admonish. 
 There is a sense, however, in which the law of contracts is con-
cerned with wrongings, and thus there is a sense in which the law of 
contracts does fit both civil recourse theory and corrective justice 
theory. The law of contracts empowers individuals to create legal en-
titlements, just as the law of wills empowers individuals to transfer 
an entitlement to property to an heir. Once an individual has had 
such an entitlement transferred to him, he has a legal right which 
the law will vindicate in many circumstances.60 The law recognizes a 
duty by the promisee to pay damages if she has breached (fitting with 
corrective justice theory), and empowers the plaintiff to enlist the 
power of the state to enforce that duty (fitting with civil recourse theory).  
 But saying this much points only to structure and not substance. 
It gives no account of why the plaintiff has a legal entitlement. The 
more interesting and robust version of civil recourse theory posits not 
just that the state empowers plaintiffs to bring a claim to enforce a 
legal entitlement, but also that the legal entitlement is based on a 
prelegal moral entitlement. It is not simply a system erected by the 
state for individuals to participate in as they choose, but rather a sys-
tem that corresponds, to some degree, to prelegal moral rights and 
duties. Without this additional claim, civil recourse theory or correc-
tive justice theory could be compatible with any account of the source 
of the rights and duties. They could track prelegal rights and duties, 
or they could be entirely a function of the current goals of the state 
that have nothing to do with prestate morality. The state could have 
the goal of maximizing welfare, for example, in which case perhaps 
we should turn private law over to those who study law and econom-
ics after all. Of course, maximizing welfare may itself be a prelegal 
moral imperative, so instead imagine a state that has arbitrary goals. 
For instance, a state could have the goal of employing as many law-
yers and judges as possible,61 or it could have a dictator who simply 
liked to watch private-law disputes as a matter of sport. In these cas-
es, the state may find all sorts of reasons for creating, or allowing the 
parties to create, legal entitlements that need not have anything to 
do with prelegal moral rights and duties. Enforcing these legal enti-
 60.  On the distinction between wrongful loss and wrongdoing, see Bridgeman, supra
note 17, at 3020-26.
 61.  Critics of tort law may argue that our own government, at least in some states, 
often seems to have this goal. 
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tlements would fit with the purely structural versions of corrective 
justice and civil recourse, but not with the more robust versions that 
claim a moral foundation. 
 As mentioned above, Richard Craswell has made a similar criti-
cism of entitlement theories.62 Perhaps more tellingly, in his more 
recent book on corrective justice theory, Jules Coleman admits that 
corrective justice does not itself provide the source of the primary du-
ties not to harm others that tort law enforces: 
Corrective justice claims that when someone has wronged another 
to whom he owes a duty of care, he thereby incurs a duty of repair. 
This means that corrective justice is an account of the second-order 
duty of repair. . . . However, the relevant first-order duties are not 
themselves duties of corrective justice. Thus, while corrective jus-
tice presupposes some account of what the relevant first-order du-
ties are, it does not pretend to provide an account of them.63
Similarly, civil recourse theory is an account of the empowerment of 
individuals to respond to wrongdoing, but it does not provide an ac-
count of what constitutes wrongdoing in the first place. 
 None of this denies that civil recourse theory has been enormously 
helpful, as has corrective justice. Clarifying the structure of private 
rights of action is an extremely important exercise. It may also be the 
case that not just any account of those rights and duties is compatible 
with the identified structure.64 Goldberg and Zipursky have spent 
much of their careers spelling out the details of what the rights and 
duties embedded in tort law look like, and I find their work largely 
persuasive. In particular, I find the idea that tort law corresponds in 
some sense to prelegal moral rights to respond to wrongdoing quite 
persuasive. To the degree that it is, the stronger version of civil re-
course theory—again, the claim that the right to respond is specifi-
cally based on a moral, prelegal right to respond—seems plausible for 
tort law.  
 But in order for it to be a plausible account of private law general-
ly, it needs to do more than make the structural point that plaintiffs 
are empowered to respond. It needs to make good on the claim that 
the point of the practice is to empower plaintiffs to respond to wrong-
doing even in contract law (plus perhaps the law of wills, property, 
trusts, etc.). Although scholars like Oman and Gold have tried to 
make good on this claim, I have suggested, without arguing here, 
that their arguments are unpersuasive, both on independent moral 
grounds and as explanations of the contract law we actually have. 
 62.  Craswell, supra note 29, at 19-22.
 63.  JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 32 (2001). 
 64.  Coleman claims as much about corrective justice. Id.
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What I have argued here is that the shortcomings of those theories 
should be unsurprising, since civil recourse theory is unlikely to ex-
plain any area of law which is largely power-conferring rather than 
duty-imposing. Power-conferring areas of law enable rather than 
admonish, and therefore seem unlikely to be explained in any non-
structural way by civil recourse or corrective justice. 
